Asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes have been intensively studied by Cramer et al. in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . In those works the focus is on full privacy and full reconstruction. We propose an alternative definition of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes where a small amount of information leakage is allowed (and possibly also non-full recovery). By a non-constructive proof we demonstrate the existence of sequences that -following our definition of goodness -have parameters arbitrary close to the optimal ones. Moreover -still using our definition -we demonstrate how to concretely construct asymptotically good sequences of schemes from sequences of algebraic geometric codes related to a tower of function fields. Our study involves a detailed treatment of the relative generalized Hamming weights of the involved codes.
Introduction
A ramp secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method to encode a secret s into multiple shares c 1 , . . . , c n so that only from specified subsets of the shares one can recover s. Often it is assumed that n participants each receive a share, no two different participants receiving the same. In that description, one talks about qualified and non-qualified sets of participants. The encoding is in general probabilistic, meaning that to each secret s there corresponds a collection of possible share vectors c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). In this paper we consider linear ramp secret sharing schemes [10] . Here, the space of secrets is F ℓ q , where ℓ ≥ 1 is some fixed integer, and c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ F q . Moreover, if c 1 is an encoding of s 1 and c 2 is an encoding of s 2 , then also c 1 + c 2 is an encoding of s 1 + s 2 . The use of the terms "secret sharing schemes" and "ramp secret sharing schemes" is a little ambiguous. Sometimes the first is used only for the case ℓ = 1, sometimes for any value of ℓ. The last term is used to emphasize that ℓ can take values larger than 1.
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be understood as a coset construction of two linear codes [10] . Given linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q , where dim C 1 = k 1 , dim C 2 = k 2 and ℓ = k 1 − k 2 , let {b 1 , . . . , b k 1 } be a basis for C 1 as a vector space over F q in such a way that {b 1 , . . . , b k 2 } is also a basis for C 2 . A secret s = (s 1 , . . . , s ℓ ) ∈ F ℓ q is encoded to
where v 1 , . . . , v k 2 are chosen at random. The shares are then the elements of c. A linear ramp secret sharing scheme is said to have t-privacy if from no set of size t one can deduce any information about the secret, but from some set of size t + 1 one can recover some information about it. Similarly, the scheme is said to have r-reconstruction if from any set of size r one can uniquely identify s, but from some set of size r − 1 one cannot. As is well-known [17] ,
where for two codes E 2 ⊂ E 1 ⊂ F n q , M 1 (E 1 , E 2 ) is the smallest Hamming weight among the words in E 1 \E 2 . The parameter M 1 (E 1 , E 2 ) is called the coset distance -or the first relative generalized Hamming weight. It is a natural generalization of the usual minimum distance of E 1 , which is obtained by choosing E 2 = {0}. The smallest possible difference between r and t is obtained when both C 2 and C 1 are MDS (implying that so are C ⊥ 1 and C ⊥ 2 ). In that case we have r − t = ℓ. When C 2 and C 1 are not both MDS we obtain r − t > ℓ.
Asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes have been intensively studied, e.g. in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . In these works the focus is on zero information leakage and full reconstruction. It seems natural to consider some small fraction of information leakage (and possibly allow nonfull reconstruction), which is what we will do in this paper. Two of the main reasons for considering such a situation are the following. First, there is a trade-off between information leakage and corruption: the more information we allow to leak, the more participants we can allow to be corrupted. And secondly, once a scheme is constructed and run, it may happen that more participants than expected are corrupted. We would like then to keep the information leakage as low as possible, and the recovery capability as high as possible.
In [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ] the authors request their schemes to have a certain multiplicative structure which makes them particular useful in connection with multparty computation. We believe that the concept of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes is also relevant without this special requirement. As shown in [16, Sec. 3 ] by a simple process any linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be made into a strong scheme with the same access structure -meaning that partial information does not imply the leakage of any part of a secret explicitly. Such a modification of the ramp secret sharing schemes is particular relevant when we allow small fractions of information leakage. Observe, however, that a scheme with the multiplicative structure treated in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , will typically loose this property when undergoing the process described in [16] . Furthermore, the security requirements in connection with multiparty computation is stronger than what is guaranteed by [16] . These observations might explain why our definition of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes has not been considered in the literature so far.
Before presenting our proposal for a new definition we discuss the connection to the celebrated topic of asymptotically good codes. An infinite sequence of codes is said to be asymptotically good if: (1) the code length n goes to infinity, (2) the rate, which is the dimension divided by the length, goes to R > 0, and (3) the minimum distance divided by the length goes to
is greater than or equal to the minimum distance d(C ⊥ 2 ). Hence by (1) , an asymptotically good sequence of codes can be used to construct a sequence of secret sharing schemes where, concerning privacy, we have that t/n goes to some number greater than 0 when n goes to infinity. In particular one can construct schemes with r/n − t/n < 1 asymptotically. This technique has been extensively exploited by Cramer et al. in [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . When dealing with fractions of information leakage (and possibly non-full reconstruction) asymptotically good codes still play a key-role. The relevant parameters, however, are no longer the first relative generalized Hamming weights, but higher relative generalized Hamming weights.
Our proposals for a new definition of asymptotically good sequence of ramp secret sharing schemes involves an infinite sequence of linear ramp secret sharing schemes (S 1 , S 2 , . . .), where the shares belong to F q and:
(S.1) The number of participants for S i is n i , where n i → ∞, as i → ∞.
(S.
2) The space of secrets for S i is F ℓ i q , where
The definition also involves a variable Ω which could typically be chosen to satisfy:
3) The space of shares for S i has dimension k 1,i , where
And finally, we also need the privacy and reconstruction numbers, which generalize the parameters t and r defined before. These numbers are t 1 , . . . , t ℓ , r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , where for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, t i and r i are the unique numbers such that
• no group of t i participants can recover i q-bits of information, but some group of size t i + 1 can, and
• any group of size r i can recover i q-bits of information, but some group of size r i − 1 cannot.
Note that t = t 1 and r = r ℓ .
We say that a sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .) is asymptotically good with deficiency Λ and defect ε if it satisfies (S.1), (S.2) and there exists a sequence of positive integers (m 1 , m 2 , . . .) such that 1 ≤ m i ≤ ℓ i , m i /n i → εL and:
This means that for large enough i, a fraction Ω−L−Λ of the participants can recover at most a fraction εL q-bits of the secret, and a fraction Ω + Λ of the participants can recover at least a fraction (1 − ε)L q-bits of the secret. The condition −εL ≤ Λ means that, when we relax the constrains on privacy and reconstruction of the secret, then the optimal value of the deficiency can possibly be negative, instead of at least zero.
Remark 2. This definition treats privacy and reconstruction in a symmetric way. The motivation behind this is the fact that if a number of participants are corrupted, then typically they can use their shares to obtain some information about the secret and make it impossible to use their shares to recover the whole secret. A general definition would require four parameters:
As shall be demonstrated in the paper, to analyze the case ε = 0 it is enough to know the relative distances. For other values of ε we will shall need the concept of relative generalized Hamming weights.
In some other cases, some participants may be corrupted and thus there may be some information leakage, but we can still use their shares to recover the entire secret. The extended definition from Remark 2 is not enough to cover this case, and thus we include the following definition:
We say that a sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .) is asymptotically good with deficiencies Λ and Λ r , and defect ε if it satisfies (S.1), (S.2) and there exists a sequence of positive integers (m 1 , m 2 , . . .) such that 1 ≤ m i ≤ ℓ i , m i /n i → εL and:
As noted in equations (1) and (2), the parameters t = t 1 and r = r ℓ are related to the relative generalized Hamming weights. For 1 ≤ s ≤ ℓ, a similar relation holds between t s , r ℓ−s+1 and the corresponding s-th relative generalized Hamming weights. Therefore, the study of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes becomes equivalent to a study of relative generalized Hamming weights.
Remark 4. The privacy and reconstruction numbers are strictly increasing, as from one additional q-bit of information one cannot obtain two more q-bits of information.
Therefore, an asymptotically good sequence of linear secret sharing schemes with deficiency Λ and defect ε is also asymptotically good with deficiency Λ − ηL and defect ε + η, if 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 − ε.
In this paper we follow two different tracks. First we extend a result from [20] on the existence of sequences of pairs of nested codes, for which the relative generalized Hamming weights asymptotically get arbitrarily close to the Singleton bound. Our modification consists in proving that such sequences can be chosen in a way that the dual codes simultaneously satisfy the same property. From this result we then prove the existence of asymptotically good sequences for any Ω and L, with arbitrarily small ǫ and Λ > −εL. The proof in [20] , as well as the proof of our modification, are non-constructive. Hence, also our proof of the existence of the above good sequences becomes non-constructive. We therefore next turn to asymptotically good sequences of one-point algebraic geometric codes. We pay particular interest to GarciaStichtenoth's tower in [13] , for which the corresponding codes can be viewed as entirely constructive [22] . Through a detailed study, based on the Goppa bound, the Feng-Rao bounds and Wei's duality theorem, we are able to derive a considerable amount of information on the relative generalized Hamming weights of the mentioned codes. From this we can construct asymptotically good sequences of schemes with low deficiency and low defect.
The paper is organized as follows: We start in Section 2 by presenting the main results of the paper, although the proofs will be given as the necessary machinery is studied. Then we continue in Section 3 by recalling how relative generalized Hamming weights describe the information leakage in linear ramp secret sharing schemes and we give some background results on these parameters. After that we extend in Section 4 the result from [20] and prove the existence of corresponding asymptotically good sequences of schemes. In Section 5, we investigate what can be said about the relative generalized Hamming weights, as well as the generalized Hamming weights, for general algebraic geometrics codes. We then determine the maximal possible difference between these two parameters, demonstrating that often it is enough to consider generalized Hamming weights. In Section 6, we consider generalized Hamming weights for one-point codes defined from general good towers of function fields over F q . Section 7 continues the study from the previous section in the special case of the tower being Garcia-Stichtenoth's second tower in [13] . The paper is concluded with Section 8, where we demonstrate how to translate the findings from Section 6 and Section 7 into asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes with low deficiency and low defect.
2 Non-constructive and constructive asymptotically good sequences
In this section we present the main results of the paper, which are five theorems stating the existence of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes with low deficiency and defect. The first of these theorems is the following. Its proof will be given in Section 4, and as we will see, it does not give a constructive way to define the corresponding sequence of schemes. However, it states that it is possible to obtain values of deficiency and defect as close to the optimal ones as wanted.
Theorem 5. For any 0 < L < Ω ≤ 1, any 0 < ε t , ε r < 1 and any Λ t , Λ r with −ε j L < Λ j ≤ Ω − (1 + ε j )L, j = t, r, there exists an asymptotically good sequence of secret sharing schemes (S 1 , S 2 , . . .) with deficiencies Λ t , Λ r and defects ε t , ε r .
On the other hand, we can establish the following theorems, whose proofs will be given in Section 8. As we will see, these sequences can be obtained in a constructive way from pairs of algebraic geometric codes. In the second Theorem below, we consider an asymmetric optimal sequence (see Remark 2), whereas for simplicity, in the other theorems we consider symmetric ones, as defined in Definition 1.
Then, there exists an asymptotically good sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .), based on one-point algebraic geometric codes, with deficiency Λ = −εL and defect ε.
Theorem 7. Let q be a power of a prime, 0 < L < Ω ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ε t , ε r ≤ Ω/L − 1. Then, there exists an asymptotically good sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .), based on one-point algebraic geometric codes, with deficiencies
− ε t L, and
and defects ε t and ε r .
Theorem 8. Let q be an even power of a prime, 1/(
. There exists an asymptotically good sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .), based on one-point algebraic geometric codes, with deficiency Λ = −2εL + 1/( √ q − 1) and defect ε.
Theorem 9. Let q be an even power of a prime, 1/(
There exists an asymptotically good sequence (S 1 , S 2 , . . .), based on one-point algebraic geometric codes, with deficiency Λ = −εL + V and defect ε.
Remark 10. From the proofs of these last four theorems, it is easy to see that the same sequence of linear secret sharing schemes can be used in all of them for all the allowed values of ε and Λ, once the parameters Ω and L are fixed, and with the restriction that q is a square for the last two theorems.
On the other hand, in Theorem 5 we can also use the same sequence for different values of ε and Λ, just by applying Remark 4.
Relative generalized Hamming weights and their use in secret sharing
Recall from Section 1 that the parameters t i and r i , where i = 1, . . . , ℓ, give us a description of the information leakage and recovery in a ramp secret sharing scheme. Definition 11. Let C 2 C 1 be linear codes, and write
. . , ℓ the m-th relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) of C 1 with respect to C 2 is
Here, SuppD is the set of indices i such that for some
is obtained by considering the special case
Observe that for m = 1, . . . , ℓ, the generalized Hamming weight d m (C 1 ) serves as a lower bound for the relative generalized Hamming weight M m (C 1 , C 2 ).
In the following theorem, which is [14, Theorem 3], we give a generalization of the identities (1) and (2):
Theorem 12. Given a linear ramp secret sharing scheme as above, for m = 1, . . . , ℓ, we have
Throughout the paper we shall often need Wei's duality theorem [25] :
Proposition 13. Let C be a linear q-ary code of length n and dimension k.
Observe that the sets on the right hand side are necessarily disjoint, from which it also follows that (d 1 , . . . , d k ) is strictly increasing.
On the other hand, the Singleton bound for relative generalized Hamming weights says that, for any m, m = 1, . . . , dim C 1 − dim C 2 , we have the inequality
As mentioned in the previous section, to demonstrate the existence of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes with arbitrarily low deficiency Λ and defect ε, we will need to modify [20, Th. 9] . This theorem, which we include as Theorem 14 below, can be viewed as saying that asymptotically one can get arbitrarily close to the Singleton bound for relative generalized Hamming weights.
then for any 0 ≤ R 2 ≤ R 1 − τ , any prime power q, and sufficiently large n, there exist linear codes
What is missing for Theorem 14 to be useful for us is that it simultaneously treats the dual codes. In the next section we extend Theorem 14 to also do this, and we use the modified theorem to prove the existence of the mentioned asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes (Theorem 5). 4 The existence of sequences with arbitrarily low Λ and ε
As stated at the end of Section 3, we need a more complete version of Theorem 14. For that purpose, we include in this section such an extension, which is thus an extension of [20, Th. 9] . We will use the notation and results in [19] and [20] . In particular, we use the concept of relative dimension length profile (RDLP) as appears in [19, Section 2] . For 1 ≤ d ≤ n, the d-th relative dimension length profile of the code pair C 2 C 1 ⊂ F n q is defined as
where
We also define the numbers N 1 , N 2 and N 3 as in [19] , for integers a, u, v, w:
We shall also need the duality relation between the RGHWs and RDLP of a code pair. This can be stated as in the next lemma, which is [19, Proposition 2]:
Lemma 15. With the same notation as in the previous paragraph, if 1 
Now, we recall the following lemma, which is [19, Lemma 9] , and establish a corollary.
Lemma 16. For fixed 1 ≤ k 2 < k 1 < n and I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the number of nested code pairs
and dim
Corollary 17. For fixed 1 ≤ k 2 < k 1 < n and I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the number of nested code pairs
Next we give two theorems that are used as preliminary results for our main theorem.
Proof. The term (6) is the total number of pairs
On the other hand, the term (7) is the total number of pairs
Finally, the term (8) is the total number of pairs
by Corollary 17. Thus, there must be at least one pair
> n d
Proof. The term (9) is the total number of pairs
On the other hand, the term (10) is the total number of pairs
Finally, the term (11) is the total number of pairs
Thus, there must be at least one pair
And now we give the main result of this section, which states that the RGHWs of both primary and dual nested code pairs can get asymptotically as close to the Singleton bound as wanted.
then for any prime power q and sufficiently large n, there exist
We shall show that (12) and (13) imply the assumption in Theorem 19 when n is large. In order to seek a sufficient condition for Theorem 19 when n is large, we can ignore polynomial factors in Theorem 19, take log q , and divide it by n 2 (not n). Then by using [20, Eq. (6)- (8)], we see that
is a sufficient condition for the assumption of Theorem 19 when n is large. Observe that the maximums in (14) and (15) are always achieved at σ = s+1 and σ ⊥ = s ⊥ + 1, respectively, and that we can substitute σ by s + 1 and σ ⊥ by s ⊥ + 1. By identifying R 1 , R 2 , α, δ, τ and τ ⊥ with k 1 /n, k 2 /n, a/n, d/n, σ/n and σ ⊥ /n, respectively, we see that
is a sufficient condition for the assumption of Theorem 19 when n is sufficiently large. Since δ ≥ τ , we see that the maximums in (16) and (17) are achieved at α = 0 simultaneously. Substituting α = 0 yields
When (18) ≥ (19), we may ignore (19) . Ignoring (19) and subtracting
Since we have assumed τ > 0, we can divide (20) by τ and obtain (12) . When (18) < (19), we may ignore (18) . Ignoring (18) and subtracting
Since we have assumed τ ⊥ > 0, we can divide (21) by τ ⊥ and obtain (13) .
To wrap up, we give the proof of Theorem 5, using this last theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. By the previous theorem, there exists a sequence of pairs of nested codes C 2 (i) ⊂ C 1 (i) with the previous parameters, and thus the corresponding sequence of secret sharing schemes satisfies
and similarly for reconstruction. Note that the hypotheses of the previous theorem are satisfied, since
Remark 21. Since the RGHWs are strictly increasing, it is easy to see that the code pair in Theorem 18 and the code pair in Theorem 19 both satisfy
Therefore, the code pair in Theorem 20 satisfies
Finally, this implies that the sequence of schemes in Theorem 5 also has deficiency
Schemes from algebraic geometric codes
The proof of Theorem 20 being non-constructive, we cannot specify the sequence of secret sharing schemes treated in Theorem 5. Also, the RGHWs related to these schemes can get as close as we want to the Singleton bound, but they do not actually reach it. In the remaining part of the paper we shall therefore concentrate on algebraic geometric codes, for which these problems can be overcome.
As a preliminary tool, and because of its general importance, we study in the present section the non-asymptotic case. In the remaining part of the paper, by a function field we shall always mean an algebraic function field of transcendence degree one. As is well-known, the related algebraic geometric codes C L (D, G) and C Ω (D, G) are dual to each other and we shall sometimes refer to the first codes as primary codes and to the last as dual codes. The Goppa bound treats both classes of codes:
Theorem 22. Let C be an algebraic geometric code of dimension k defined from a function field of genus g. The minimum distance d of C satisfies
Throughout the paper, for a function field F over F q , we denote by N (F ) the number of rational places and by g(F ), the genus. Also recall the parameter
, where the limit is taken over all function fields over F q of genus g(F ) > 0.
The Drinfeld-Vlăduţ bound [24] states that
holds for any prime power q. For q being a square it is well-known that equality holds in (22) . We refer the reader to [2] for the status on what is known about A(q) for q being a non-square. From the Goppa bound (Theorem 22), we can directly derive the following corollary, which gives a first simple result on asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes, when ε = 0: Corollary 23. For any 0 < L < Ω ≤ 1, there exists a sequence of secret sharing schemes (S 1 , S 2 , . . .) with deficiency Λ ≤ 1/A(q) and defect ε = 0.
On the other hand, sometimes it is enough to treat the so-called threshold gap r − t [6] , and from the previous theorem we immediately get: Theorem 24. Let C 2 C 1 be algebraic geometric codes defined from a function field of genus g.
The corresponding secret sharing scheme has t privacy and r construction where t ≥ k 2 − g and r ≤ k 1 + g. In particular r − t ≤ ℓ + 2g.
The Singleton upper bound (4) and the Goppa lower bound on the relative generalized Hamming weights of algebraic geometric codes give the following result on the threshold gaps r m − t m : Proposition 25. Let the notation be as in Theorem 24. For m = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we have that
and in general, for 1 ≤ α, β ≤ ℓ,
where the left inequalities are reached if and only if the Singleton bound is reached for both the primary and the dual codes.
As observed in [23, Cor. 4.2], the Goppa bound in combination with Wei's duality theorem (Proposition 13) gives us the following information on the generalized Hamming weights.
Proposition 26. Let C be an algebraic geometric code of dimension k defined from a function field of genus g. If k > g, then C is (g + 1)-MDS.
This allows us to improve parts of Proposition 25 as follows:
Proposition 27. If ℓ ≥ 2g, then for m = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ,
and, if g + 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ − g, then r m − t m = 1.
Proof. Since ℓ ≥ 2g, we have that m ≤ g implies that ℓ − m + 1 ≥ g + 1, and ℓ − m + 1 ≤ g implies that m ≥ g + 1. In both cases, either r m = k 2 + m or t m = k 2 + m − 1, since at least one reaches the Singleton bound. Thus, one term g is subtracted and we obtain the first bound. On the other hand, if g + 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ − g, then both r m and t m reach the Singleton bound and the last equality is obtained.
Non-asymptotic bounds for one-point algebraic geometric codes
In this subsection we shall concentrate on one-point algebraic geometric codes. Hence, for the codes C L (D, G) and C Ω (D, G), we shall always assume that D = P 1 + · · · + P n and that G = µQ, where P 1 , . . . , P n , Q are pairwise different rational places. Writing ν Q for the valuation at Q, the Weierstrass semigroup corresponding to Q is
As is well-known, the number of missing positive numbers in H(Q) equals the genus of the function field. The conductor by definition is the smallest element in H(Q) such that all integers greater or equal to that number belong to the set. We shall write g and c for the genus and the conductor, respectively. Consider the related subset
Proof. The first part of the lemma is a particular case of [15, Theorem 2.65], and the second part is proved in [9, Theorem 3] . The final remark follows from the definitions and the other two results. All of these statements are consequences of the Riemann-Roch theorem.
From now on we consider a pair of codes
respectively, and ℓ = dim(C 1 /C 2 ) = k 1 − k 2 . Observe that ℓ ≤ µ = µ 1 − µ 2 , with equality if 2g ≤ µ 2 < µ 1 ≤ n − 1 holds. We have the following bounds on RGHWs from [14, Theorems 19, 20] :
Instead of computing these minimums, in the following two propositions we bound them for some values of m.
(Note that C 2 could be {0}, since we are allowing µ 2 = −1, and thus we obtain bounds on the GHWs of C 1 .)
Proof. We consider some numbers 
On the other hand, we have that
. Thus, from the previous theorem, we obtain
Applying Lemma 28, we get the result.
Note that C 1 could be F n q , since we are allowing µ 1 = n + 2g − 1, and thus C ⊥ 1 = {0} and we obtain bounds on the GHWs of C ⊥ 2 .
Proof. We consider some numbers
On the other hand,
}, which are m elements in the range (µ 2 , µ 1 ]. Thus, from the previous theorem we obtain
Applying again Lemma 28, we get the result.
Remark 32. From Proposition 26 we already know that algebraic geometric codes are (g + 1)-MDS. Obviously g < c, and we should therefore only apply Proposition 30 and Proposition 31 for m ≤ g.
RGHWs versus GHWs for one-point algebraic geometric codes
In this subsection we compare the RGHWs with the GHWs of the pair of primary one-point algebraic geometric codes C 2 C 1 , where the notation is as in the previous subsection. After that, we treat the dual case. In this way we can see how much we are losing by considering GHWs instead of RGHWs.
For that purpose, we also use the notation from [14, Sections IV and V]. First write H * (Q) = {γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ n }, with γ 1 < γ 2 < . . . < γ n . Now, fix functions f i in the function field, such that −ν Q (f i ) = γ i , and write b i = (f i (P 1 ), f i (P 2 ), . . . , f i (P n )), which constitute a basis of F n q . Then, we define the function ρ : F n q → {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} by 
The main result is the following:
Proposition 34. Using the same notation as in the previous section, assume that 0 ≤ µ 2 < µ 1 , 2g ≤ µ 1 ≤ n − 1, and
Proof. Since D ∩ C 2 = {0}, we have that ρ(D \ {0}) ∩ ρ(C 2 \ {0}) = ∅ and hence i 1 ≤ k 2 . From 2g ≤ µ 1 ≤ n − 1 and Lemma 28, it follows that µ 1 = γ k 1 . Thus, we have that
, where the last inequality follows from µ 1 − γ i 1 ≥ ℓ. Finally, from this and the previous lemma, it follows that #SuppD
As a direct consequence, we obtain an upper bound on the difference between RGHWs and GHWs:
Corollary 35. Under the same hypotheses of the previous proposition, and C 2 ) . On the other hand, if D∩C 2 = {0}, then by the previous proposition and the Singleton bound, 
Proposition 37. Using the same notation as in the previous section, assume that 0 ≤ µ 2 < µ 1 , 2g ≤ µ 2 ≤ n − 1, and
Proof. First of all, since D ∩ C ⊥ 1 = {0}, we have that i m > k 1 . From 2g ≤ µ 2 ≤ n − 1 and lemma 28, it follows that µ 2 = γ k 2 . Thus, we have that
On the other hand, {α ∈ ∪
These two sets are disjoint, since k 2 < i 1 and thus µ 2 < γ i 1 . Therefore, we obtain the bound #{α ∈ ∪
Again, as a consequence we obtain an upper bound on the difference between RGHWs and GHWs:
Corollary 38. Under the same hypotheses of the previous proposition, and
Proof. The proof is the same as in the previous corollary.
Recall that one of the main purposes of this paper is to construct asymptotically good sequences of secret sharing schemes using algebraic geometric codes coming from good towers of function fields. The following proposition shows that, asymptotically, the difference between RGHWs and GHWs of one-point algebraic geometric codes can be very small or even zero.
Proposition 39. Consider a sequence of pairs of one-point algebraic geometric codes
And similarly for dual codes. In Section 7 we shall apply the theory of this section to codes coming from Garcia-Stichtenoth's tower in [13] of function fields over F q , where q is a square. As we shall recall in that section, for this tower, both g i /n i and c i /n i go to 1/( √ q − 1), as i goes to infinity. Hence, for this tower we have
Remark 40. If we just use the Goppa bound and write g i /n i → γ ′ , we have that 1 − R − γ ′ + ρ ≤ δ ≤ M ≤ 1 − R + ρ, and thus we obtain the upper bound M − δ ≤ γ ′ . However, this upper bound does not decrease when R increases, but the bound in the previous proposition does.
If we apply the above remark to Garcia-Stichtenoth's tower from [13] , then we obtain M −δ ≤ 1 √ q−1 , while from the proposition, we derive M −δ ≤ 1 √ q−1 − R, which is always an improvement.
6 Asymptotic analysis for algebraic geometric codes over general finite fields
From [23, Th. 5.9] we have the following theorem, which could almost be viewed as a corollary to Theorem 14 by choosing R 2 = 0 (We would have to replace δ + R ≤ 1 + ρ by δ + R < 1 + ρ for it actually to be a corollary). We will denote by n(C) the length of a code C.
Theorem 41. Let q be a fixed prime power. For any pair (δ, R) and any ρ ≤ R such that ρ ≤ δ ≤ 1, δ + R ≤ 1 + ρ, and any growing sequence m i → ∞, there exists an infinite sequence of linear q-ary codes (C 1 , C 2 , . . .)
The proof given in [23] of Theorem 41 uses a sequence of asymptotically good algebraic geometric codes, which suggests that one could attain the Singleton bound for any ρ and R with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ R ≤ 1 by using codes from an optimal tower of function fields over F q . For instance, this could be done in a constructive way for q being a square by using one of GarciaStichtenoth's tower, see [22] . Unfortunately, as we explain below, the proof given in [23] imposes an unnoticed restriction on ρ and R which leaves many cases undecided. This restriction is
which in particular by (22) means that 1/( √ q − 1) ≤ ρ. Plugging in for instance q = 4 we obtain 1 ≤ ρ ≤ R, leaving Theorem 41 empty. For q = 9 the restriction is 1 2 ≤ ρ ≤ R, leaving many cases undecided.
For the convenience of the reader we recall below the proof from [23] of the existence of an infinite sequence of algebraic geometric codes (C 1 , C 2 , . . .),
demonstrating that the assumption 1/A(q) ≤ ρ is needed for their proof to hold true.
We now prove (24) . Consider an infinite sequence (F 1 , F 2 , . . .) of algebraic function fields over F q , with g(F i ) → ∞ and
Consider a sequence of corresponding one-point algebraic geometric codes
, which concludes the proof of (24).
It is possible to replace the condition 1/A(q) ≤ ρ ≤ R with the less restrictive condition that
Note that the lines ρ = (25) is an improvement of (23) . To prove (25) we recall the following result corresponding to [23, Cor. 3.6] . Setting s = 1 we obtain:
Corollary 43. Let the notation be as in the previous proposition, and let 2 ≤ r ≤ dim C. Then
where d is the minimum distance of C.
Consider the sequence of algebraic geometric codes as above. Let f : N → N be a function such that f (i) → ∞ and f (i)/n i → 0, as i → ∞. The Goppa bound and Corollary 43 tell us that
which is non-negative if dim C i ≥ g(F i ) (corresponding to the requirement that 1/A(q) ≤ R). Therefore,
if
holds. Dividing (26) and (27) with n i , taking into account the Singleton bound and letting i → ∞, we obtain
where by choosing (m 1 , m 2 , . . .) appropriate we can assume m i /n i → ρ, for any fixed number ρ such that
We have proved the following theorem:
Theorem 44. Given a power of a prime q, 1/A(q) ≤ R ≤ 1 and C 2 , . . .) be a sequence of algebraic geometric codes defined from a tower of function fields (F 1 , F 2 , . . .), with g(
There exists a sequence (m 1 , m 2 , . . .) of positive integers such that m i /n i → ρ, d m i (C i )/n i → δ and
The next proposition can give us some information in the interval where the above theorem fails to provide such.
Proposition 45. Given a power of a prime q, 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ R, let (C 1 , C 2 , . . .) be a sequence of algebraic geometric codes defined from a tower of function fields (F 1 , F 2 , . . .), with g(
Proof. Let 0 < ε < 1 be an arbitrary fixed number. From Corollary 43 we obtain
Hence, using the Goppa bound for the minimum distance (Theorem 22), we obtain
Now the GHWs are strictly increasing and therefore we have
Now, letting i → ∞ in (28) first and then letting ε → 0, we conclude that
Remark 46. It is remarkable that choosing ρ = 0, we actually obtain a strictly stronger result than just using the asymptotic Goppa bound for the minimum distance.
We shall return to Theorem 44 and Proposition 45 in Section 8, where we will show how to obtain asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes from them (Theorem 6 and Theorem 7.
7 Asymptotic analysis for schemes over F q when q is a square Garcia and Stichtenoth gave two towers in [12, 13] of function fields over quadratic finite fields attaining the Drinfeld-Vlăduţ bound. The tower in [13] is given by:
, where q is an even power of a primer number. The number of its rational places is N (F ν ) ≥ q ν−1
, we have the following expression for the conductor of H(Q) when Q is the pole at
In this section, we apply Proposition 30 and Proposition 31 to derive new asymptotic results that we then compare with the general ones from the previous section.
As a corollary to the above mentioned propositions, we derive the following first result. 
, and
Proof. Take (F 1 , F 2 , . . .), the tower of function fields defined in [13] , and take
where g i and n i are the genus and number of rational places of F i , respectively.
where D i is a divisor of degree n i − 1 and with n i − 1 distinct places not containing Q i , which is the unique pole of x 1 ∈ F i (see [13] ), and take m i such that m i /n i → ρ. Since
(see the expressions for g i and n i at the beginning of the section), we just need to apply Proposition 30 and Proposition 31 to obtain the lower bounds on δ and δ ⊥ . Now we compare this bound with other bounds. Its first feature is that it is of the form δ ≥ U + 2ρ, where U + ρ = 1 − R + ρ − 1 √ q−1 is the Goppa bound and U does not depend on ρ. On the other hand, when ρ = 1 √ q−1 , then U + 2ρ = 1 − R + ρ and the Singleton bound is reached. Thus, this bound increases additively with ρ from the Goppa bound to the Singleton bound.
This means that, for every bound of the form δ ≥ A+ρ, where A does not depend on ρ, we have that A < 1 − R and there will always be a nonempty interval ρ ∈ (a, b) ⊂ [0,
The optimal choices of a and b in such case would be a = max{0, A − U } and b = 1 √ q−1 . Next we compare it with our previous asymptotic results from Section 6. We know that, if
and we also have the bound
However, the bound in Corollary 47 is better than this last one if, and only if,
This condition holds for every ρ ∈ [0,
, we obtain a bound that is not redundant with our previous results when
and the length of this interval is
which is a number in (0, 1) when q ≥ 9. For example, taking q = 9 or q = 16, we obtain that the length of this interval is 1/2 or 14/45, respectively.
We next use Theorem 13 (Wei's duality theorem) to improve the previous asymptotic bound. We only consider primary one-point algebraic geometric codes. The case of duals of one-point algebraic geometric codes is analogous.
Corollary 48. If q is an even power of a prime,
there exists a sequence of one-point algebraic geometric codes C i and a sequence of positive integers m i such that:
Proof. Consider the same codes, C i , as in corollary 47, together with the same parameters m i such that
, which is positive, for large enough i. Therefore,
contains at most f (i) elements. From Wei's duality theorem (Proposition 13), we conclude that
Dividing by n i and letting i → ∞, we obtain the result.
We observe that Corollary 48 simplifies to Theorem 41 (with the necessary restriction (23) ) when V = 0, and improves the asymptotic Goppa bound when 2V = 1/( √ q − 1).
Next we compare again with our previous asymptotic results. To obtain a bound that is not redundant with the previous ones, the parameters V and ρ need to satisfy the following:
q−1 R, in order not to be redundant with Theorem 44, and
to improve the previous bounds (Proposition 45 and Corollary 47).
The necessary and sufficient conditions for these inequalities are the following:
The interval for V is nonempty, and for such values, the corresponding interval for ρ is also nonempty. Furthermore, if R ≤ 1 − 1 √ q−1 , the length of the interval for V is at least q − √ q + 1 (q − 1)( √ q − 1) , which is also positive if q ≥ 9, and for q = 9 or q = 16, is 7/16 or 13/45, respectively. If moreover 2V ≥− 1 We conclude this section by discussing a recent bound that was derived in [3] for generalized Hamming weights of arbitrary dual one-point algebraic geometric codes. Combining [3, Cor. 2 and (12)] we obtain, for any u > 1, the following estimate for the tower discussed above:
where n (i+1−log q (u+1))⌋ − 1.
Thus, this lower bound on dual weights is upper bounded by
Since n i = q i+1 2 − q i 2 , we find that this number goes to
where dim C i /n i → R, g i /n i → 1 A(q) and m i /n i → ρ. Thus, the method of [3] asymptotically gives nothing but the usual Goppa bound for this tower.
8 Asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes from algebraic geometric codes
Coming back to our main objective, each of the asymptotic bounds that we have obtained in Sections 6 and 7 gives information about the deficiency and defect that we can achieve on a sequence of ramp secret sharing schemes constructed from towers of function fields.
The strategy to obtain these asymptotically good sequences of schemes is analogous in all the cases. It consists in defining a suitable sequence of pairs of codes C 2 (i) ⊂ C 1 (i) ⊂ F n i q such that: dim C 1 (i)/n i → Ω, (dim C 1 (i) − dim C 2 (i))/n i = ℓ i /n i → L, (εℓ i )/n i → εL = ρ, for i → ∞, and choosing Λ appropriately so that
To be able to claim the existence of such sequences of pairs of codes, we need to make an important remark about all the new results that appear in sections 6 and 7. From the proof of these results, it is easy to see that we can claim the existence of sequences of nested pairs of algebraic geometric codes C 2 (i) ⊂ C 1 (i), where at the same time, the GHWs of both sequences C 1 (i) and C 2 (i) ⊥ satisfy the thesis of the corresponding result, for ρ ≤ L.
Moreover, since we only need to use a tower of function fields such that g(F i )/N (F i ) → A(q) −1 in all these results, we can fix lim i→∞ dim C j (i)/n i , for j = 1, 2, and use the same sequence of pairs of codes for different values of ρ. In this way, we obtain an asymptotically good sequence of schemes with different possible choices of pairs of deficiency and defect numbers, as was mentioned in remark 10.
Next we present the proofs of Theorem 6, Theorem 7, Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, which are consequences of Theorem 44, Proposition 45, Corollary 47 and Corollary 48, respectively. For simplicity, we give the proofs of the first two theorems, the other two being completely analogous.
Proof of Theorem 6. Define ρ = εL, R 1 = Ω and R 2 = Ω − L. From Theorem 44, we obtain a sequence of code pairs C 2 (i) ⊂ C 1 (i) ⊂ F n i q , with dim(C j (i))/n i → R j , for j = 1, 2, δ = lim inf i→∞ d m i (C 1 (i))/n i and δ ⊥ = lim inf i→∞ d m i (C 2 (i) ⊥ )/n i , where δ = 1 − R 1 + ρ, and
for a suitable sequence of positive integers m i . Now, we just need to define Λ = −εL in order to satisfy equations (29) and (30).
Proof of Theorem 7. Define R 1 = Ω, R 2 = Ω − L and ρ j = ε j L, for j = t, r. From Proposition 45, we obtain a sequence of code pairs C 2 (i) ⊂ C 1 (i) ⊂ F n i q , with dim(C j (i))/n i → R j , for j = 1, 2, δ = lim inf i→∞ d m i . Now, we just need to define Λ t and Λ r as in the Theorem in order to satisfy equations (29) and (30) (in the asymmetric version).
Proof of Theorem 8. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 6, using Corollary 47 instead of Theorem 44.
Proof of Theorem 9. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 6, using Corollary 48 instead of Theorem 44.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have coined two new definitions of asymptotically good sequences of ramp secret sharing schemes, and then described how to obtain some sequences with parameters close to the optimal ones. The main results are Theorem 5, which is based on the non-constructive Theorem 20, and Theorems 6, 7, 8 and 9, which use sequences of pairs of one-point algebraic geometric codes that can be described in an explicit and constructive way.
